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De-concentrating Poverty: De-constructing a Theory and the Failure of Hope
Michael Diamond*
Introduction
Our nation is moving toward two societies,
1
one black, one white – separate and unequal

Racial segregation has been a problem in the United States for generations. Despite
the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968, 2 many of the nation’s communities remain
highly segregated by race. The economic segregation of the poor has also been a major
problem although until about 25 years ago it had commanded far less attention. Given the
high correlation between poverty and race, the combination of racial discrimination and
the limited availability of affordable housing has had the effect of thrusting the poor into
(or creating) neighborhoods with concentrated pockets of extreme poverty. Many
commentators have claimed that this concentration of poverty has produced enormously
negative societal consequences.
In 1987 William Julius Wilson, then a University of Chicago sociologist, published
his influential book, The Truly Disadvantaged. 3 While Wilson was not the first to point
out the negative effects of concentrated poverty, the book fomented a revolution in
housing policy. Wilson argued that the concentration of poverty, the very high percentage
of people with incomes below the poverty line living within a defined geographic
community, resulted in severely negative societal externalities far in excess of what
would be expected for isolated circumstances of individual poverty. 4
Wilson’s observations led to a series of federal and local policy prescriptions, each
having the ostensible goal of de-concentrating poverty in high-concentration
neighborhoods. Among the resulting legislative initiatives was the HOPE VI program for
the redevelopment of public housing. 5 Congress also adopted a demonstration program,
Moving to Opportunity (MTO), 6 in which low-income residents were given special §8
vouchers in order to move to other, often suburban, low-poverty neighborhoods. There
were also several local programs designed to accomplish the same result.7

* I would like to thank my friends and colleagues, Peter Byrne, Mike Seidman and Gerry Spann for their
extremely useful comments on various drafts of this chapter. I also want to acknowledge the exemplary
research assistance of Jared Lamb. This article first appeared in COMMUNITY, HOME AND IDENTITY,
Michael Diamond & Terry Turnipseed, eds. (Ashgate 2112).
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US Nat'l Advisory Comm'n on Civil Disorders, Report Of The National Advisory Commission On Civil Disorders
(1968) [hereinafter Kerner Commission Report].
2
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006).
3
William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, The Underclass, and Public Policy (1987).
4
This argument, while accepted by many social scientists and policy-makers, has been strongly contested, a point to
which I will return later in this chapter.
5
Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub L. No. 105–276, 112 Stat. 2461, 2473–74 (1998)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437v (2006)).
6
Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing, Pub. L. No. 103-120, § 3, 107 Stat. 1148 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1437f (2006)).
7
One of the oldest and most widely utilized is Inclusionary Zoning. Inclusionary Zoning (which may be mandatory
or voluntary, depending on the jurisdiction) requires developers to include a certain percentage of affordable units in
their residential developments of more than a certain number of units. In exchange, the developer receives some form
of regulatory relief, often a density bonus above what the zoning regulations would ordinarily allow or fast-track
processing of permits. The percentage of affordable units and the targeted income of lower income residents varies by
jurisdiction. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 25A–1 (2006).
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Even before The Truly Disadvantaged was published, there had been efforts to
break up the racially concentrating effects of federal public housing policy. For example,
Hills v Gautreaux 8 challenged the racially segregated siting of public housing by the
Chicago Housing Authority (CHA). The litigation resulted in a consent decree that
ultimately allowed more than 7,000 households to move to less segregated housing in the
Chicago metropolitan area.9 Due, again, to the high correlation between class and race,
particularly in public housing, the extreme racial segregation that was the focal point of
the Gautreaux suit also resulted in a very high concentration of poverty in those Chicago
neighborhoods. 10
There is, however, a certain irony to the development of and ardor for these
governmental programs, since a major contributing cause of racial and (to a great extent)
economic segregation in many residential communities had been the housing and housing
finance policy of federal and local governments. For example, beginning in the 1930s and
continuing, certainly at least, through the 1960s and early 1970s, the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), The United Stated Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), and their predecessors and affiliates had an explicit policy of
segregating the races and, as time went on, of displacing residents in predominantly black
communities in the name of redeveloping “blighted” urban neighborhoods.11
For a particularly stark example of the interplay between racial segregation and
concentrations of poverty, one, again, need look no further than the policies concerning
the siting of public housing developments that were challenged in Gautreaux. For
decades, public housing developments, which came to house some of the nation’s poorest
families, were placed in predominantly minority neighborhoods.12 These developments,
large, highly segregated, and housing an extremely poor population, contributed mightily
to the considerable concentration of poverty in those communities (in fact, often causing
the high concentration of poverty) while also reinforcing the preexisting pattern of
segregation. 13
The Gautreaux litigation, begun in 1966, was initiated by residents in segregated
public housing operated by the CHA. 14 The litigation resulted in a consent judgment that
called for the dispersal of CHA residents to less racially segregated communities, which,
incidentally, were also often less poor. Under the consent decree program, CHA residents
were given vouchers that allowed them to move to other housing accommodations and
about 7,000 households took advantage of the program.
After Gautreaux, several programs, both federal and local, were initiated to the
point that today, the effort to de-concentrate poverty has become an accepted, if not the
8

425 US 284 (1976).
Molly Thompson, Relocating from the Distress of Chicago Public Housing to the Difficulties of the Private Market:
How the Move Threatens to Push Families Away from Opportunity, 1 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 267, 270 ("The
Gautreaux Program ended in 1998 after relocating approximately 7100 families." (citing LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ &
JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND COLOR LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA 39
(2000))).
10
Of course, the fact that the original neighborhoods contained large public housing projects almost guaranteed the
high poverty concentrations that accompanied the racially discriminatory siting policies of the CHA.
11
See, e.g., Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States, 195–218 (1985).
12
See Gautreaux, 425 US at 286–87.
13
The governmental policies were not, of course, the sole cause of the segregated communities. In fact government
policy typically reflected public attitudes at the time. These attitudes were also often shared by the government
policymakers.
14
While conditions in the various public housing developments were often deplorable and while the social
environment was dangerous and unsatisfactory, the case was about the discriminatory siting and resident placement
in these developments.
9
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preeminent, anti-poverty choice in federal and many local policy circles. 15 The deconcentration policy, however, has met with substantial criticism from a range of
commentators including academics, community activists and policy-makers as well as
from many residents who are (or who are threatened to be) subjected to the deconcentration policy. The criticism has been about both the practical implementation and
performance of the programs and about more conceptual issues concerning their very
nature.
On the practical level, studies have shown repeatedly that many of the hoped-for
fundamental benefits of de-concentration have not been achieved. For example, lowincome residents have failed, for the most part, to build social capital when they have
moved into higher-income neighborhoods or when they returned to redeveloped HOPE
VI neighborhoods. 16 Moreover, there has not been appreciable gain for the economically
integrated low-income residents in their employment or income status.17 Instead, there is
substantial evidence that such residents have suffered significant economic or other
hardship due to higher housing costs, 18 higher costs of daily living, 19 and problems with
transportation. 20
On the conceptual level, critics have focused on the destruction of preexisting
communities 21 and the elimination for many people of the social safety net that their old
communities provided for them. 22 Some take the critique even further and suggest that, as
was claimed to be the case with Urban Renewal and the Interstate Highway program, the
current de-concentration programs are deliberately designed to and, in most cases do,
displace African-American families and communities.23

15

Even the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program, the other major governmental affordable housing initiative,
permits some mixing of income levels.
16
Melody L. Boyd et al., The Durability of Gains from the Gautreaux Two Residential Mobility Program: A
Qualitative Analysis of Who Stays and Who Moves from Low-Income Poverty Neighborhoods, 20 HOUS. POL'Y
DEBATE 119, 125 (2010).
17
Edward G. Goetz, Better Neighborhoods, Better Outcomes? Explaining Relocation Outcomes in HOPE VI. 12
CITYSCAPE 2, 9 (2010).
18
LARRY BURON ET AL, THE HOPE VI RESIDENT TRACKING STUDY 99 (2002), available at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/410591_HOPEVI_ResTrack.pdf: Susan J. Popkin, The HOPE VI Program: What
has Happened to the Residents, in WHERE ARE THE POOR TO LIVE: TRANSFORMING PUBLIC HOUSING COMMUNITIES 83
(Larry Bennett et al., eds, 2006).
19
Boyd et al., supra note 16, at 125; SUSAN J. POPKIN ET AL., A DECADE OF HOPE VI: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND
POLICY CHALLENGES 45 (2004), http:// www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411002_HOPEVI.pdf.
20
James Rosenbaum et al., New Capabilities in New Places: Low-Income Black Families in Suburbia, in THE
GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 168 (Xavier de Souza Briggs
ed., 2005).
21
Stephen Steinberg, The Myth of Concentrated Poverty, in THE INTEGRATION DEBATE: COMPETING FUTURES FOR
AMERICAN CITIES 213, (Chester Hartman & Gregory Squires eds, 2010)
21
Stephen Steinberg, The Myth of Concentrated Poverty, in THE INTEGRATION DEBATE: COMPETING FUTURES FOR
AMERICAN CITIES 213, (Chester Hartman & Gregory Squires eds, 2010)
22
This includes financial support from friends and relatives as well as other support such as child care and
transportation assistance.
23
See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 21. (“It is debatable whether integration efforts bestow on poor African-Americans
economic or sociological benefits or, rather, destroy non-white political power, sense of community, culture, and
neighborhood-based support systems.”) (quoting William P. Wilen & Wendy L. Stasell, Gautreaux and Chicago’s
Public Housing Crisis: The Conflict between Achieving Integration and Providing Decent Housing for Very LowIncome African Americans, in WHERE ARE POOR PEOPLE TO LIVE? TRANSFORMING PUBLIC HOUSING COMMUNITIES
supra note 18, at 239, 249); David Imbroscio, “[U]nited and Actuated by Some Common Impulse of Passion":
Challenging the Dispersal Consensus in American Housing Policy Research, 30 J. URB. AFF. 111 (2008).
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In this chapter I add my own critique to the literature on the de-concentration of
poverty. 24 Part of my concern is about implementation. For example, even if all of the
supposed benefits were available to relocating residents (which they are not), the
aggregate number of households being relocated by these programs represents only a tiny
portion of the households living in highly concentrated neighborhoods.25 Moreover, the
destroyed affordable housing in poor communities is not being replaced on a one-for-one
basis. The result is an increasing gap between the demand for decent affordable housing
and the supply. 26 This is particularly troubling for the lowest income residents who
comprise a significant percentage of those who live in public housing. Because the
private market cannot economically house them and there are no other governmental
programs designed to do so, the units lost due to de-concentration will never be
replaced. 27 The result is increased homelessness, more people “doubling up” in units, and
more people paying a very high percentage of their household income for rent, thereby
leaving other household needs unmet.
My main critical focus, however, will be on the conceptual problems of deconcentration. In particular, I am apprehensive about the social, cultural, and political
ramifications of destroying existing communities. Despite popular conceptions, poor
communities, just as other communities, contain networks and institutions that are
valuable to the residents of those communities and to society. For just this reason, many
people faced with involuntary dislocation under one of the de-concentration programs
resist the move. Moreover, those who are forced to move often move back to their
original or to a similar neighborhood at their first opportunity. 28 The consequence is that
the forcible de-concentration of poverty in one neighborhood often creates new or
worsening concentrations in other neighborhoods. This presumably unintended
consequence, a result of the lack of affordable housing throughout the economy, suggests
the weakness, if not the failure, of the de-concentration policy.
It does not follow that we, as a society, should encourage concentrated poverty.
Economic integration has many advantages. In fact, to the extent that de-concentration
programs are voluntary, that is, to the extent that residents of concentrated low-income
communities want to move to mixed-income, mixed-race communities, they should be
encouraged. On the demand side, support, both financial and technical, should be made
available by government to residents of high-concentration neighborhoods. On the supply
side, greater support should be provided for the development and preservation of
24
While the critique will focus primarily on the HOPE VI program, which is by far the largest of the federal deconcentration programs, the concerns that I and others have expressed are applicable, to a great extent, to the other
federal and many local programs. Where critiques do not have general applicability, I will discuss the distinctions to
be made.
25
As of 2008, 72,265 households had been relocated from HOPE VI developments, which represented 98% of the
planned relocation. There were 91,802 units demolished, 95% of the planned demolition: 72,196 units were
constructed or rehabilitated, 65% of the planned total of 111,059. Of these planned new or rehabilitated units, about
55% will go to public housing residents although only about 24 % of the original households had returned to the
completed HOPE VI development of the planned 38% of households to return. G. Thomas Kingsley, Appendix A:
Scope and Status of the Hope VI Program, in FROM DESPAIR TO HOPE: HOPE VI AND THE NEW PROMISE OF PUBLIC
HOUSING IN AMERICAN CITIES 300 (Henry C. Cisneros & Lora Engdahl eds, 2009). Kingsley discounts the net loss of
units by pointing out that many of the destroyed units were unoccupied and many of these were “vacant and
uninhabitable” (although he concedes that the number of habitable but unoccupied units is not reliably known). Id.
26
J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed,
34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527 (2007).
27
It is not an adequate response to say that a large number of the demolished units were uninhabited or even that they
were uninhabitable. The fact is that those units were in existence to serve the extremely low-income population but
they have permanently been taken out of the inventory.
28
Boyd et al., supra note 16, at 122.
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affordable units throughout the economy and fair housing laws should be strictly
enforced to allow unfettered mobility.
The compulsory destruction of communities and involuntary displacement of
residents, however, is another matter. Such actions are, to my mind, immoral, impractical
and incoherent. They should be replaced with policies that provide for strengthening
existing communities and for increasing the availability of affordable housing in higher
income communities. The latter should be accompanied by mobility counseling and
rental or purchase subsidies so that low-income households generally would be able to
choose whether to move from their original communities to higher income
neighborhoods and have the ability to do so if that is their choice
The alternative that I will develop later in this chapter is that we must strengthen
existing low-income communities through appropriate interactive institutions (schools,
health care, day care, job training, economic development, and so on). We should
concentrate on making existing low-income communities into places where residents are
proud to reside. These would be places where residents might retain the social ties and
the supports available in their communities while at the same time offering them some of
the benefits theorized by the advocates of mixed-income communities.
Low-income communities are fundamentally similar to other, higher-income,
communities: there are people with talent and ambition; there are social connections that
are valuable to existing residents; and institutions that can provide the link between the
talent, ambition and connections that already exist in the broader community. Offering
residents a realistic choice between moving to mixed-income, mixed-race communities or
remaining in a significantly improved, socially and economically viable original
community, is a better model of addressing the problems of concentrated poverty.
In this chapter I lay out the nature of the concentration problem and some of its
causes and consequences, and then I go on to describe current de-concentration programs
and examine the major successes and disappointments of these programs. I elaborate on
the criticisms that have already been leveled against them and add my own to the queue.
Finally, I propose an alternative to the current focus on the de-concentration of poverty.
The Concentration of Poverty
Long-term poverty has been publicly recognized as a problem in the United States
at least since the 1960s when President Lyndon Johnson initiated his War on Poverty. 29
Since that time, there have been countless federal, state, and local programs designed to
combat both individual and systemic poverty. Despite these programs, poverty has
persisted and the gap between those who have and those who have not has widened. 30

29

President Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 8, 1964). I
recognize that the War on Poverty, during the mid 1960s, attempted a multifaceted approach to fighting poverty and
met with, at best, mixed success. Later in this chapter, I will attempt to distinguish my approach from the earlier
effort.
30
CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., US CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 4 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf
("Approximately 31.6 percent of the population had at least one spell of poverty lasting 2 or more months during the
4-year period from 2004 to 2007."). The Gini index (also known as the Gini coefficient) is a traditional measure of
income inequality. See id. at 10. "The Gini index was 0.469 in 2010. Except for the 1.5 percent decline in the Gini
index between 2006 and 2007, there were no other statistically significant annual changes since 1993, the earliest
year available for comparable measures of income inequality. Since 1993, the Gini index is up 3.3 percent." Id.

5

Moreover, poverty in the United States has become increasingly concentrated.31 In 2000
more than 6.7 million people lived in communities of concentrated poverty. 32
Several explanations have been offered for the increased concentration of the very
poor in particular neighborhoods. A superficially benign explanation is Wilson’s claim
that the de-segregation of housing led to the voluntary outmigration of relatively
wealthier African-Americans from the racially (but not economically) segregated urban
neighborhoods in which they lived to other neighborhoods, often in the suburbs.33
Those left behind were, to a great extent, households without the financial means
to leave. The problems caused by the exodus of working class and, middle-and upperincome African-Americans from their communities were exacerbated by the loss of wellpaying industrial jobs in the urban centers. Thus, remaining families not only lost what
Wilson thought was the social adhesive that kept the communities together and well
functioning, but also the means for those who remained to obtain well-compensated
employment. 34
Other commentators have pointed to several less benign causes. These include
persistent racial discrimination and the lingering effects of consciously implemented
governmental interventions in markets that were intended to segregate citizens by race
and economic class. 35 Examples of these policies include the explicit early guidelines of
the Federal Housing Administration concerning mortgage availability for AfricanAmericans; 36 the segregated siting of public housing developments; the Interstate
Highway program; and the Urban Renewal program. Each of these programs pushed
people into highly segregated neighborhoods and physically isolated those
neighborhoods, or forced people to remain in them. Later, when it became expedient for
governments to recapture the land or to dislocate existing communities (after government
policies had helped to segregate the neighborhoods), government programs often
31

Daniel T. Lichter et al., The Geography of Exclusion: Race, Segregation, and Concentrated Poverty 2 (Nat'l
Poverty Ctr., Working Paper No. 11–16, 2011) ("We document a 25 percent increase in the number of poor places
during the post-2000 period (and growing shares of poor people living in them) after deep and widespread declines in
concentrated poverty during the economic boom of the 1990s.").
32
ALEMAYEHU BISHAW, US CENSUS BUREAU, US DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AREAS WITH CONCENTRATED POVERTY: 1999,
at 3 tbl.1 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/censr-16.pdf (2.8% of approximately 281
million United States citizens – approximately 7,868,000 people – lived in census tracts with 40% or more of
residents living in poverty at the time of the 2000 Census); Claudine Gay, Moving Out, Moving Up: Housing Mobility
and Political Participation of the Poor 2 (Harvard University, Working Paper, 2008) (unpublished paper on file with
the author).
33
See WILSON, supra note 3, at 49 (“… I emphasized that inner-city neighborhoods have undergone a profound social
transformation …. as reflected not only in their increasing rates of social dislocation (including crime, joblessness,
out-of-wedlock births, female-headed families, and welfare dependency) but also in the changing economic class
structure of ghetto neighborhoods. I pointed out that [previously] these neighborhoods featured a vertical integration
of different income groups [who] all resided more or less in the same ghetto neighborhoods. I also stated that the very
presence of working- and middle-class families enhanced the social organization of inner-city neighborhoods.
Finally, I noted that the movement of middle-class black professionals from the inner city, (sic) followed in
increasing numbers by working-class blacks, has left behind a much higher concentration of the most disadvantaged
segments of the black urban population …”).
34
Id. at 38–41.
35
Prior to desegregation, the governmental policies affected minorities regardless of class. After desegregation, much
of the discrimination resulted in the social and economic isolation of low-income minorities who had insufficient
political or economic power to fight these policies and insufficient resources to escape the isolation.
36
The practice of “redlining” was created by the Home Owners Loan Corporation and later adopted by FHA.
Redlining draws its name from FHA’s practice of rating neighborhood quality by color scheme. The lowest quality
neighborhoods, often reserved for those in which African-Americans resided, were coded red. See DOUGLAS S.
MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 51
(1993).
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permitted or required bisecting or bulldozing these communities in the name of further
societal progress. A few examples should suffice to demonstrate governmental
complicity in the concentration of poverty.
Beginning in the 1930s, through the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) and
the FHA, the federal government deliberately steered funds away from African-American
neighborhoods and from African-American applicants for mortgages even if they were
financially qualified for the loan. 37 This practice, which continued for several decades
after the creation of these agencies, contributed to highly segregated neighborhoods and a
low rate of urban homeownership among African-Americans. 38
In addition to the restrictions placed on the ability of minorities, particularly
African-Americans, to purchase homes or even to live in integrated communities, federal
and local policies concerning public housing placements and occupancy added to the
segregation and isolation of minorities, and to the concentration of poverty.
The result, if not the intent, of the public housing program of the United States was
to segregate the races, to concentrate the disadvantaged in inner cities, and to reinforce
the image of suburbia as a place of refuge for the problems of race, crime, and poverty. 39
The Gautreaux litigation led to a change in these policies. The District Court
found, in Gautreaux v Chicago Housing Authority, 40 that CHA had selected sites for
public housing and had assigned tenants to those sites on the basis of race: 41 the parties
then entered into a consent decree by which lotteries were established for current
African-American residents of (or those on the waiting list for) public housing in
Chicago. The winners of the lotteries obtained §8 vouchers and housing counseling to
assist them in obtaining housing in predominantly white neighborhoods in the Chicago
metropolitan area. At its conclusion, approximately 7,100 families were relocated under
the program. 42
Two other, non-housing federal programs also had significant influence in
disrupting or isolating minority communities. Starting in the late 1940s and the early
1950s, the Urban Renewal program 43 and the Interstate Highway program 44 each wrought
havoc on existing communities, almost always low-income minority communities.

37

For an interesting history of these federal programs, see JACKSON, supra note 11, at 195–218.
“A government offering such bounty to builders and lenders could have required compliance with a
nondiscrimination policy … Instead, FHA adopted a racial policy that could well have been culled from the
Nuremberg laws. From its inception FHA set itself up as the protector of the all-white neighborhood. It sent its agents
into the field to keep Negroes and other minorities from buying houses in white neighborhoods.” CHARLES ABRAMS,
FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 214 (1955).
39
JACKSON, supra note 11, at 219.
40
296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
41
“Uncontradicted evidence submitted to the District Court established that the public housing system operated by
CHA was racially segregated, with four overwhelmingly white projects located in white neighborhoods and with 99
1/2% of the remaining family units located in Negro neighborhoods and 99% of those units occupied by Negro
tenants.” Id. at 910.
42
James E. Rosenbaum et al., Can the Kerner Commission’s Housing Strategy Improve Employment, Education and
Social Integration for Low-Income Blacks, in RACE, POVERTY, AND AMERICAN CITIES 275 (John Charles Boger &
Judith Welch Wegner eds, 1996); ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTRODUCTION
167 (2006).
43
Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931, 942 (2010) ("[I]n the past,
such movement of individuals through displacement (such as urban renewal programs) has shown only sporadic
success at advancing race and class integration, and it has meant land loss for minority families and the demolition of
stable, historically rooted communities."). "As previously noted, urban renewal and redevelopment programs have a
38
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Urban Renewal (which was known as Urban Redevelopment prior to the passage
of the Housing Act of 1954) was intended to redevelop areas that had been designated as
slums. Local governments, with significant assistance from the federal government,
acquired land subject to the slum designation and made it available to private developers
for redevelopment. There have been many criticisms of the program, both as to its goals
and its effects. For example, Peter Marcuse has claimed that the supporters of Title I of
the Housing Act of 1949 (the Title that created the urban redevelopment program) were
not concerned with rehousing slum dwellers, but with tearing down slums – at least those
casting a blighting influence on major business areas.45
The result was the displacement of entire communities without provision for the
return of former residents. Moreover, urban renewal eventually was used for more than
slum clearance as many neighborhoods that were not slums were also bulldozed.46
Despite the destruction of whole neighborhoods in which many residents had low or very
low incomes, little or no new replacement housing was built to accommodate those
displaced. Thus, large numbers of low-income displacees moved to other neighborhoods
with existing low-cost housing, creating or exacerbating high-concentration poverty
neighborhoods.
The Federal Highway Act was passed in 1956 and had similarly doleful
consequences on low-income minority communities. First, because land in and around
poor communities was often cheaper and because political opposition there was likely to
be less intense, the government often exercised its eminent domain rights to take such
land for its right of way, thus disrupting the lower-income communities by displacing
many of its residents. 47 Second, the communities that remained were often isolated by the
new highways that cut them off from other urban amenities. 48 Such communities
became, almost literally, “the other side of the tracks.”
Ironically, many of the current government programs designed to de-concentrate
poverty are actually seeking to undo the effects of prior government policies that led to,
or at least assisted in, the concentration in the first place. Perhaps this policy shift resulted
from a good faith reconsideration of earlier judgments, a natural evolution of societal and
governmental social vision. As already noted, Wilson’s work called attention to
significant negative externalities that he claimed were associated with the concentration
of poverty: it is also possible, though, that the second thoughts about concentrated
poverty reflect no more than the current response to changing preferences of the white
middle class whose members want to return to reinvigorated cities. Moreover, there was

dark and extensive history of displacing low-income minority communities in order to make way for land uses that
benefit political majorities." Id. at 949 n.57.
44
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84–627, 70 Stat. 374 (1956).
45
Peter Marcuse, Housing Policy and the Myth of the Benevolent State, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 255
(Rachel B. Bratt et al., eds, 1986).
46
The Supreme Court approved such actions in Berman v. Parker, 348 US 26 (1954).
47
Cf. Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.–
C.L. L. REV. 413, 449 (2006) ("The Federal Highway Act funded a highway system to link cities to growing suburbs,
permanently destroying much predominantly minority, low-income housing to build roads on which poor, car-less
minorities rarely drove. Such targeted infrastructure development also led to depreciation or significantly lower
appreciation in black areas than in white areas, further concentrating wealth among the population already controlling
the most assets.") (citations omitted).
48
See Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth: The Promise, Politics, and Potential Pitfalls of Emerging Growth
Management Strategies, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 260 (2000) ("Planners of the Federal Highway Act of 1956 declared
that the effect of the massive highway building program would be 'to disperse our factories, our stores, our people; in
short, to create a revolution in living habits.' This is precisely what has occurred." (quoting William H. Whyte Jr,
Urban Sprawl, in THE EXPLODING METROPOLIS 133, 144 (1957))).
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pressure on government by developers who wished to cater to the desires of the
prospective middle class occupants by developing what they considered to be underused
urban land.
The Movement to De-concentrate Poverty
As the concentration of poverty accelerated,49 Wilson’s work called attention to what he
claimed were the significant negative externalities associated with it.50 Congress, as well
as many state and local legislatures, accepted the idea that concentrations of poverty
created these externalities and that they, in turn, led to social and financial costs to local
jurisdictions and to many individuals and families. Legislative bodies began to consider
ways to reduce the concentration of poverty and thus to reduce the public costs associated
with the perceived pathologies.
Two distinct approaches have been utilized by governments in attempting to
alleviate the concentrations of poverty. The first involves dispersing the poor from dense,
high-concentration neighborhoods to other, less poor, areas. This approach is exemplified
by federal programs such as Gautreaux and Moving to Opportunity. On a local level,
many jurisdictions have adopted Inclusionary Zoning programs, 51 and programs modeled
on MTO. San Diego, for example, has implemented a local program known as Choice
Communities 52 to assist low-income residents to move from high-concentration
neighborhoods to higher-income communities.
The other approach adopted by many jurisdictions is to bring wealthier residents
into previously high-concentration communities. HOPE VI represents the federal effort in
this regard, while local programs such as the District of Columbia’s New Communities
Program 53 attempt to replicate HOPE VI on a local level. Some critics attack these
programs as spurring the market phenomenon of gentrification, the purchasing of
property in formerly low-income areas by affluent buyers desirous of urban living
environments. Often, but not always, the affluent buyers are of a different race than the
lower-income original residents.54
In implementing these programs, governments adopted the theory that by deconcentrating the poor, the negative externalities associated with concentration would be
reduced. Residents who were able to reside in mixed-income communities, a stated goal
49

The growth of concentrated poverty has been explosive. Edward G. Goetz, citing studies by Danziger and
Gottschalk and Jargowsky, both of which used a 40% threshold for concentration, has pointed out that between 1970
and 1990, the number of high poverty neighborhoods more than doubled and the number of people living in these
neighborhoods grew from 4.1 million to 8 million. EDWARD G. GOETZ, CLEARING THE WAY: DECONCENTRATING THE
POOR IN URBAN AMERICA 25 (2003).
50
WILSON, supra note 3, at 21–22.
51
See Nicholas Benson, Note, A Tale of Two Cities: Examining the Success of Inclusionary Zoning Ordinances in
Montgomery County, Maryland and Boulder, Colorado, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 753 (2010) ("First enacted in
communities on the East and West Coasts more than forty years ago, inclusionary zoning is now implemented in 250
local communities across the United States. In total, these inclusionary programs have generated an estimated eighty
to ninety thousand affordable housing units since their inception.") (citation omitted).
52
San Diego Housing Commission Choice Communities, http://sdhc.org/Rental-Assistance/Rental-AssistanceParticipants/Request-to-Move/Choice-Communities/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
53
Office of the Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic Development, New Communities, THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, http://dmped.dc.gov/DC/DMPED/Projects/New+Communities (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).
54
Some have argued that gentrification is beneficial to the lower-income residents who are able to remain in
gentrified communities. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405 (2003). Others,
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of the de-concentration effort, 55 could be expected to obtain the benefits that Wilson
thought existed in black communities prior to de-segregation; role modeling, social
control and social networking leading to economic improvement for the poor.56
Professor Mark Joseph, a critic of the programs designed to implement mixedincome communities, has restated Wilson’s cataloging of the supposed benefits of such
programs. Their goals, he says, are:
• the creation of social interaction and social networks between the higher and
lower income residents that could lead to better employment opportunities;
• the establishment of social control;
• role modeling; and
• creating better access to goods and services due to the social and human capital
of the higher-income residents.57
Many of these supposed benefits, Joseph observes, attempt to rectify defects that the
policy-makers supposed existed in the low-income residents themselves, a reworking of
the conventional bromide about the “undeserving” poor. They do not respond to defects
in the social or economic structures of society that caused (or at least contributed to) the
economic problems of many low-income people. 58 This is only one of several critiques of
the de-concentration policies that have been adopted. Other critics doubt the sincerity of
the stated program goals 59 and still others decry the destruction of community, regardless
of the motivations for doing so. 60 Moreover, commentators, both critics and supporters
alike, point out that many of the stated goals of the programs have not been met and some
of these commentators think they cannot be met. 61 In the sections that follow, I will
address these criticisms, beginning with evidence of the failure of the programs to
achieve many of their stated goals.
Outcomes of the De-concentration Programs
In this section, I examine studies analyzing only the various federal programs. This
is due, in part, to the relatively recent advent of many of the local programs (with the
exception of Inclusionary Zoning which originated more than 30 years ago) and the
relative paucity of data on the newer local initiatives. It is also important to keep in mind
here the variety of goals that have been attributed to these programs. They run from the
redevelopment of blighted communities to the reduction in the concentration of poverty
so as to improve the quality of life and economic opportunities for lower-income
residents to the reduction of the social costs of the concentration of poverty. There has
been a good deal of success on the redevelopment front, but not as much on the improved
opportunities for the poor, or in the reduction of social costs to society.

55
It should be noted that some critics have suggested that the goal of HOPE VI was not offering the original residents
the opportunity to reside in mixed-income communities but rather to redevelop the public housing site into a mixed
income community. See, e.g., Susan Clampett-Lundquist, Moving Over or Moving Up? Short-Term Gains and
Losses for Relocated HOPE VI Families, 7 CITYSCAPE 57, 58 (2004).
56
See WILSON, supra note 3, at 30.
57
Mark Joseph, Early Resident Experiences at a New Mixed-Income Development in Chicago, 30 J. URB. AFF. 229,
233 (2008).
58
Id. Joseph goes on to observe that mixed-income development does not address the underlying causes of persistent
poverty.
59
Imbroscio, supra note 23 at 112 (in the context of discussing relocation in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina).
60
See Steinberg, supra note 23; Imbroscio, supra note 23.
61
See Goetz, supra note 17, at 6 (residents who are displaced by HOPE VI typically move to better neighborhoods
but improvement in the quality of their lives “…. is mixed, being quite modest in most cases and frequently non
existent.”).
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The most visible measure of success has been purely physical. It has involved the
demolition of highly distressed and very dense public housing developments and the
replacement of these projects with new, lower-density developments with a substantial
number of new units going to market rate buyers and renters. Many critics have pointed
to the governmental emphasis on redeveloping toxic sites rather than on rehousing the
poor in mixed-income developments. 62 One frequent writer about HOPE VI, Susan
Popkin, has noted that even the research on the program done by HUD focuses primarily
on neighborhood benefits, not on those displaced by the programs. 63
For the displacees, the benefits are less clear. Many move to better housing and to
neighborhoods with less overall poverty and crime 64 although even these benefits are
subject to qualification and come with significant costs. Other benefits, such as more
social capital leading to more and better employment and wages, social integration, and
better health and educational outcomes are not supported by the evidence.65 In fact, there
is some evidence suggesting the overall condition of displacees may have worsened. The
remainder of this section will be devoted to these findings.
Levels of Poverty De-concentration and Racial Integration
I begin this discussion with what should be an alarming reality. A huge percentage
of the residents of public housing projects subject to the HOPE VI program are AfricanAmerican or Latino, as are the residents of the communities surrounding those sites. 66
Moreover, 80 per cent of the residents on HOPE VI sites have total income below the
poverty line. 67 Reducing this overwhelming race and class segregation was one of the
major stated goals of the de-concentration programs, but the results have been far from
encouraging.
Even if the de-concentration programs were highly successful in relocating former
residents to mixed-income, mixed-race communities, the total number of persons
relocated would comprise only a tiny portion of the poor who lived in communities
segregated by race and/or class.68 But, of course, the programs are not highly successful
in such relocation. Very few displaced residents of Public Housing end up in truly mixedincome communities. Kingsley et al., for example, found that as of 2000, 49 per cent of
the residents displaced from HOPE VI sites went to other public housing developments
while 31 per cent obtained §8 vouchers and moved to private housing. Of these, many
moved to nearby neighborhoods with income and racial demographics much like the
neighborhoods they left. The remaining 20 per cent received other HUD assistance, no
assistance at all, or were unaccounted for. 69

62

See, e.g., Clampett-Lundquist, supra note 56, at 57. Clampett-Lundquist points out that nearly one half of those
displaced from public housing due to HOPE VI relocate to other public housing projects. Only approximately 11%
are slated to return to the redeveloped HOPE VI community. For those slated to return, the “temporary” relocation
time may be four or five years. Id. at 57. Many others moved to other high-poverty neighborhoods. Id. at 66.
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Popkin, supra note 18, at 68.
64
Id. at 70; see also; POPKIN,ET AL, supra note 19 at 30; Goetz, supra note 17, at 5.
65
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POPKIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 8.
67
Id. at 9. HUD targets the poorest to live in public housing and only the poorest would live there.
68
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than 30%.
69
G. Thomas Kingsley et al., Patterns of Section 8 Relocation in the HOPE VI Program, 25 J. URB. AFF. 427, 429
(2003).
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Many researchers have found that while the rate of poverty in the communities to
which displacees moved is significantly lower than in their original communities, it is
still quite high. 70 Moreover, the communities to which displacees moved remained highly
segregated by race. 71 Nevertheless, many commentators have lauded the reduction of
poverty rates from more than 60 per cent on average to approximately 27 per cent. 72 Few
of these commentators, however, discuss the fact that the poverty rate on HOPE VI sites
has been enormous. Thus, the mere destruction of the public housing site and the
dispersal of its residents to other communities, even if near the original site, would place
those residents in neighborhoods with much lower rates of poverty. 73
Two additional facts are worth noting in this regard. Many of the communities to
which displacees moved were “fragile” and had high rates of poverty even prior to the
influx of the former HOPE VI residents. 74 This influx pushes these communities towards
higher concentrations of poverty, albeit sometimes remaining below the recognized
danger threshold of 30 per cent. 75 In addition, the evidence suggests that many displacees
who moved to lower-poverty neighborhoods moved back to their original neighborhood
(or to one geographically close to it) within a few years. 76
Levels of Social Capital and the Benefits Derived from it
Access to neighborhood resources may depend, at least in part, on the degree to
which residents have or can form social networks within resource-rich neighborhoods. 77
One of the major assumptions underlying Wilson’s theory about the effects of
concentrated poverty was that the very poor needed higher-income people in their
neighborhoods to act as role models, to assert a degree of social control, and to provide a
level of social capital that would translate into better employment and income
opportunities for them. Even if one accepted Wilson’s underlying assumption, there are
two significant problems with the de-concentration initiatives that emanated from his
theory. First, the mixed-income communities Wilson described prior to desegregation
were organic. While they were created as a result of a pernicious social policy, they were
of longstanding duration and were characterized by limited entrance or exit by residents.
People had important commonalities, both demographic and experiential, that bound
them together. The communities created by de-concentration programs were artificially

70
For example, Kingsley et al., found that the average poverty rate in census tracts containing public housing
developments was 38% while the rate in tracts with HUD assisted housing averaged 22% and those containing §8
voucher holders averaged 19%. The poverty rate in census tracts with HOPE VI designated public housing averaged
61%. The tracts to which displacees of these projects moved averaged 27%. Id. at 433.
71
POPKIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 29; Popkin, supra note 18, at 69. See also Kingsley et al., supra note 70, at 428,
where the authors point out that, while these problems do not characterize the program as a whole, in many cities
displacees wind up in seriously distressed, high-poverty neighborhoods not far from their original site.
72
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76
Boyd et al., supra note 16, at 122.
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Id. at 124.
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constructed, often with unwilling participants on each side. 78 The second problem, which
derives from the first, is that in these communities, there is very little meaningful social
interaction taking place among the higher-and lower-income residents. 79 Moreover, there
is little evidence that living in these communities improves the life chances for the poor.80
These findings should not be entirely unexpected. The concept of community
generally requires some element of commonality among the theoretical members. 81 What,
one might ask, other than geography would qualify as a common bond among the HOPE
VI displacees and higher-income residents of an existing community to which they
moved? This lack of commonality is exacerbated when one considers that, for the most
part, the move by the displaced HOPE VI residents was involuntary 82 and the reception of
them by the members of the receiving community was rarely welcoming. 83
The absence of social capital contributed to disappointing results for other
important goals of de-concentration such as increased employment and earnings
opportunities. A much more subtle negative effect was the loss of social capital that had
existed in the displacees’ original communities. While a more detailed discussion of both
of these issues will be presented later in this chapter, a comment from one of the
displaced public housing residents aptly describes the feelings of many displacees:
I mean, I understand what they were trying to do. I do understand what they
were trying to do and they were trying to give people better opportunities, but
to force people away, to force people away from their family, their support
system. You know, just common things that people need to have. It’s not
84
beneficial.

This absence of social capital was a major factor in limiting new low-income
residents in mixed-income communities from achieving some of the other goals of the
de-concentration initiatives. For example, the data regarding the success of the lowincome movers to mixed-income communities in finding better employment or increasing
income is bleak. This is true both for the adult movers and for their children after they
became adults. 85 In fact, participants in mobility programs may actually do worse than
non-participants in being able to use contacts to find employment. 86 This is the result not
only of the lack of social contact between the economic classes: it is also due to the fact
that many of the displacees have lower educational attainment, fewer employment skills
and less work experience than their higher-income neighbors. Therefore, the jobs for
which they would be qualified are limited and are less likely to be the type that the
higher-income neighbors would be aware of. 87
There are other obstacles to employment for displacees. Assuming, as is often the
case, the lower-income residents do not own cars, transportation to places of employment
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may be difficult. 88 The availability of child care may determine whether a resident can
take an available job.89 Moreover, there are a series of health-related barriers, including
asthma, diabetes, and obesity that prevent many displacees from obtaining employment. 90
These barriers are independent of the existence of systemic discrimination, which also
remains an obstacle for minorities in actually obtaining available jobs for which they are
qualified. 91
Costs to Displacees
There are other, non-employment-based problems associated with the move to
mixed-income communities. While there is evidence that displacees who moved to
mixed-income communities lived in better housing and safer neighborhoods,92 there is
also evidence that the move imposed significant costs on them. These include both direct
and indirect financial costs. The indirect costs include the loss of social networks and the
benefits these networks provided, such as material goods, child care, and informal social
control. 93
In addition to the emotional and indirect financial costs of moving away from
social networks, there were direct financial costs as well. These included higher costs for
needs such as transportation and child care which often made it difficult for many movers
to afford food and other necessities. Perhaps more surprisingly, housing costs increased
for many people who moved to the private market. The increase was due primarily to
utility costs, which were previously covered in their public housing rents, but were no
longer covered by the §8 voucher provided to displacees. 94
The psychological costs were also high. Aside from the obvious sense of distance
from friends, movers felt a sense of stigma and alienation in their new communities. 95
Displacees often felt as if they were being monitored by a disapproving community. They
also reported a sense of relative deprivation in comparison to their higher-income
neighbors. 96 One commentator has pointed to the “de-mobilizing” effect of being poor
and living in a community of plenty97 which results in the lower-status individuals
experiencing feelings of alienation.98 One other area of cost should also be mentioned
although it is more ephemeral than some of the others. This is the loss of influence
concerning neighborhood issues suffered by those who moved to mixed-income
communities. The loss is the result of several factors: the newness of the movers to the
community and the associated lack of social capital that has already been mentioned; the
relatively greater sophistication of the preexisting residents; and the greater financial and
political resources of those residents. This loss is partially offset by the relatively greater
level of goods and services in the community, many of which one could hypothesize
substantially all residents would desire. Nevertheless, these goods and services typically
88
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cater to the wishes of the higher-income residents and, in any case, are often obtained
without input from or, in many cases, consideration of the needs of the new, lowerincome residents. 99
Critiques of the De-concentration Programs and Strategy
In this section, I discuss the practical and theoretical criticisms that have been (or
could be) leveled against the de-concentration concept and programs. Among the most
basic complaints is that, even if the programs were highly successful in achieving their
stated goals, their scale is so small in comparison to the need that they make minimal
impact into the racial and economic segregation of the poor. But, of course, the programs,
as I demonstrated in the previous section, have not met many of their stated goals. In
addition, the implementation of the programs has imposed substantial costs both on the
displacees and on those who remain in concentrated low-income neighborhoods.
Study after study has shown that there has been little neighboring between the
higher-and lower-income residents of a mixed-income neighborhood. 100 There has been
little social capital developed and little or no improvement in employment status, hours
worked or overall income. 101 Mental health outcomes for the low-income residents were
mixed. While many movers reported a greater sense of well-being in their new
community, others reported a sense of alienation, stigma and relative deprivation.102
Research has not shown that the provision of “basic” resident services in mixed-income
communities has led to improved obesity and mental health outcomes for displacees. 103
Similarly, several studies show no positive educational outcomes for the children of
movers. 104 Many, in fact, did not change schools, but continued attending their original
school. 105 For those who did change schools, there has been little interaction between the
new students and their higher-income classmates. 106 Even where such interaction existed,
the low-income students did not consider their classmates as role models and they had
little or no interaction with the parents of their new classmates.107 Conversely, many
lower-income students also reported feelings of racism, stigma, and isolation.108
The failures of these programs to achieve their goals in reference to those who
moved to mixed-income neighborhoods is all the more striking because these who moved
into the mixed-income settings were selected only after a rigorous screening process
designed to identify the most stable and upwardly mobile public housing residents. Hardto-house families, on the other hand, were offered very little as they were shunted to
other public housing projects or allowed to move with their §8 voucher to other high-
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poverty neighborhoods geographically and demographically close to their original
communities. 109
In order to be eligible to move into a mixed-income community, public housing
residents had to:
• be in compliance with their existing lease;
• be working at least 30 hours per week;
• have no unpaid utility bills;
• have no criminal record; and
• pass a drug test.110
The fact that those who moved to mixed-income neighborhoods did not achieve the
success that was predicted for them raises the question that many have asked: can
proximity alone influence social relations?111 The answer seems to be no. The creation of
community, the creation of relationships that encourage interaction with and concern for
others requires significant commonalities among the members. 112 These commonalities
are not immediately apparent when low-income people of color move into communities
of middle-and upper-income white residents. Thus, the expectation of employment
opportunities and social support emanating from the higher-income residents for the
benefit of the new, lower-income residents appears to be unrealistic.
These implementation failures are not, however, the main problems associated
with the de-concentration strategy. The main problems are conceptual. There are three
major theoretical difficulties associated with the de-concentration strategy. First, it breaks
up existing communities on the supposition that they are valueless or, worse, toxic, and
cannot be made to function adequately. The break-up is undertaken without consultation
with the residents of those communities and in disregard of the wishes of many of them.
Second, it is based on the premise that, somehow, economic integration will compensate
for structural flaws in the economic and social systems. It ignores systematically imposed
educational and skills deficits brought on by past discrimination and turns a blind eye to
current prejudice. Third, it caters heavily to the needs of business interests and middleincome, predominantly white, homebuyers. In this way, it is reminiscent of the racially
based displacement of poor people that occurred under the Urban Renewal and Highway
programs, programs that regularly served the interests of people other than those
displaced.
The Break-up of Existing Communities
A widespread view of low-income communities, particularly those of color, is that
they are dysfunctional. This is even more pronounced when the community is in a public
housing development. This view is the theoretical basis for the de-concentration strategy.
However, low-income communities generally function well, albeit without the various
accoutrements of wealth. Most adults work, interact in traditional ways, rely on their
friends and neighbors, and obey the law. In fact, William Ryan et al. found “… contrary
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to conventional wisdom, people at different income levels display pretty much the same
distribution of values, social attitudes and lifestyles.”113
What, then, accounts for the alacrity with which we seek to disrupt existing
communities? One answer might be the replacement of a decaying physical
infrastructure. If that is all that is being sought, however, it could be done without the
destruction of otherwise serviceable housing or, it could be done with allowing all who
want to return to the redeveloped community to do so. If what is sought is improvement
of the quality of life for residents of the disrupted community, again, the method chosen
seems unsuited to the task. For those who move to mixed-income communities, they do
gain better housing and better physical infrastructure. They do not gain much social
capital and, in fact, may lose much of the benefit provided by social capital in the old
communities. A more pressing question is what happens to those who do not move to
mixed-income communities?
The evidence is clear that those chosen to move to mixed-income neighborhoods
are (in conventional terms) the highest achievers among the local residents. Thus, the
problems first suggested by William Julius Wilson, that is, the drain of talent and
resource from minority communities due to desegregation, is repeated by the “creaming”
of the public housing residents. Those who move to other public housing projects or into
private housing in “fragile” nearby communities are left to fend for themselves without
counseling or social services associated with the move. Given the de-concentration
theory, this would be likely to exacerbate the problems of those displaced to other lowincome communities and of the communities to which they move.
But it is also clear that, despite their obvious problems, low-income communities
also have strengths. They certainly contain networks of personal connections that make
many residents reluctant to leave them. 114 In addition, there are often well-functioning
institutions, both public and private, that address many of the needs of local residents.
While there may not be a sufficient number of these institutions and those that exist may
not have sufficient resources to meet all of the needs of those who live there,
nevertheless, they do provide a basis for a different way of thinking about concentrated
poverty.
Concerning social services, there is an efficiency associated with providing these
services, which essentially everyone agrees is a necessary ingredient in the battle against
poverty, in a confined geographic area. It is certainly more difficult and more costly to
provide such services across a wide geographic area and with widely dispersed
recipients. 115 Again, this is not to say that society should restrict the poor to certain
neighborhoods. It is to suggest that such neighborhoods exist and that they offer
numerous benefits to the residents. Instead of destroying them, governmental policy
could focus on making them stronger and more beneficial to those who live in them and
to those who might want to.
De-concentration and Structural Flaws
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American society has been plagued by the problem of persistent, systemic poverty.
For centuries and across cultures, however, society has viewed this problem as being
primarily attributable to the poor, themselves. Distinctions between poverty and
pauperism, between the “deserving” and the “undeserving” poor, have dominated policy
as well as common discourse. For centuries in England and the United States, distinctions
were made between those who suffered poverty due to conditions beyond their control
such as advanced age, infancy, disability, or sickness and all others who were said to be
lazy, unambitious, drunkards or criminals. 116 The latter group was labeled as paupers or
the undeserving poor and was largely cut off from assistance. The former group, labeled
the deserving poor, obtained various forms of assistance from their communities, from
charities, or from the state. 117 These characterizations were often highly correlated with
race, but the symbiosis between race and poverty was rarely examined.
Even recently, there have been labels of the poor that suggest the blame for poverty
lies with the poor, themselves. Terms such as the “culture of poverty” and the
“underclass” have been used in the past several decades to describe certain groups of
poor people. The culture of poverty was first brought to public consciousness by Oscar
Lewis. He used the term to describe several “traits” that he ascribed to the poor. The
culture, he said:
… tends to perpetuate itself from generation to generation because of its effects
on the children. By the time the slum children are six or seven, they have
usually absorbed the basic values … and are not psychologically geared to take
full advantage of … increased opportunities that may occur in their
118
lifetimes.

Michael B. Katz pointed out that the culture of poverty concept was not intended to
classify the poor. He claims, however, that it did just that. Most commentators, according
to Katz, recognized that the “culture of poverty” did not apply to all poor people. Rather,
it placed in a class by themselves those whose behaviors and values converted their
poverty into an enclosed and self-perpetuating world of dependence. Although some of
its exponents located the sources of poverty in objective factors such as unemployment,
the new concept resonated with traditional moral definitions.119
Similarly, the term “the underclass,” which started as an academic concept, was
transformed into a popular and pejorative label for urban African-Americans. Beginning
with Gunnar Myrdal’s use of the term underclass “to describe the victims of
deindustrialization,” 120 the term went through a series of definitions until the 29 August
1977 issue of Time Magazine did a cover story entitled, “The American Underclass:
Destitute and Desperate in the Land of Plenty.”121 The article went on to describe, in
particularly negative terms, the personal attributes of poor, urban African-Americans.
The term as a pejorative label had entered the popular consciousness.
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The HOPE VI program and many other de-concentration programs have at their
core, albeit often tacitly, a similar belief in the moral and intellectual incapacity of many
of the poor, particularly poor people of color. 122 Among the central claims for these
programs is the social control and role-modeling that will result when the poor are living
with higher-income neighbors. Recall William Julius Wilson’s lament that desegregation
resulted in the removal of the social adhesive that had allowed African-American
communities to function and that gave young people role models and hope for the
future. 123 The structural flaws in the society are not addressed by the de-concentration
strategies. The question might be asked as to how mixed-income communities will end
racial discrimination? How will they create millions of jobs that offer a living wage?
How will they offer better basic and vocational education to poor young people? As Mark
Joseph has said:
… it is unlikely that mixed-income residence by itself can promote
observable change in the short or medium term. In terms of
employment, the roles of macrostructural factors-the strength of the
economy, the availability of accessible jobs for which residents are
qualified and for which they will be fairly considered-cannot be
124
influenced by simply relocating to a mixed-income development.

The Cynical View of Community Redevelopment
The final theoretical critique of de-concentration programs that I will discuss is
that they often serve the interests of people other than the low-income residents who are
subject to their disruptions. There are several interest groups who stand to benefit by the
redevelopment of formerly low-income inner-city neighborhoods. These include local
governments looking for greater tax income from development and from the higherincome residents who will occupy these redeveloped spaces. A second constituency is
higher-income buyers who are looking for safe and convenient urban living experiences.
Third are the real estate developers who are seeking valuable “underutilized” land to
redevelop and sell. Next, there are merchants who would not have ventured into the
former neighborhoods but might now hasten to serve the higher-spending new occupants.
Finally, there are those who might wish to minimize the political organization and
potential power of low-income residents. This can be accomplished by dispersing them to
areas where they will be overshadowed in numbers, financial resources and social and
political networking by their higher-income neighbors. It might also be accomplished
merely by breaking up existing constituencies and networks.
These concerns are reminiscent of those expressed in connection with the Urban
Renewal program in the 1960s when the process of destruction of African-American
communities in the name of slum removal and redevelopment came to be known, in
James Baldwin’s term, as “Negro Removal.” 125 Massey and Denton argue that Urban
Renewal was enacted at the behest of white elites. Their goal was to stop the spread of
African-American neighborhoods that might threaten their elite enclaves. Thus, entire
black neighborhoods were razed and redeveloped for other uses. These areas became a
buffer against the expanding black ghetto while at the same time forcing the former
residents into other highly segregated neighborhoods, or into newly constructed public
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housing projects that were placed in African-American neighborhoods and were, of
course, themselves highly segregated. 126
The political similarities between Urban Renewal and HOPE VI are stark. In each
case, there was a public rhetoric of offering assistance to those in need, of redeveloping
highly distressed communities. I am sure there were many, policy-makers and citizens
alike, who pursued these programs in the belief that what they were doing was beneficial
to the poor. And, to be fair, in many cases there was improvement in the quality of life of
low-income residents who moved as a result of the de-concentration programs,
particularly in the lives of those who moved voluntarily. Most displaces, however, were
involuntarily displaced. This meant that connections, support networks and, to use the
encompassing term, communities, were disrupted. 127
It also meant that, since more housing units were destroyed than were replaced,
displacees were largely shunted to neighborhoods with significant vacancy rates or to
where they could double up. These tended to be other low-income neighborhoods with
high or growing concentrations of poverty. As a consequence of the stringent eligibility
requirements for residents to move to mixed-income communities, many of the
involuntary displaces were hard-to-house households which often put additional strains
on the new communities to which they moved. Already inadequate social services were
stretched even thinner when the need was for far greater support.
Finally, whatever political power and organizing opportunities existed in the
original neighborhoods was disrupted, if not destroyed, by the displacement that resulted
from the de-concentration programs. For the movers to mixed-income communities, the
loss is obvious. The movers became a small minority in a new community in which they
had few ties and in which new ones proved difficult to create. For the displacees who
moved to other low-income communities, they entered new settings in which their old
connections had been weakened and they needed access to existing networks that were
likely to have preexisting hierarchies and social norms.
Community-building Alternatives to De-concentration
The movement to de-concentrate poverty is based upon the supposition that
communities with very high concentrations of poverty involve insurmountable problems
for the residents of those communities and for society. Sometimes, this is true. More
often, it is not. Communities, and this term connotes something more than merely an
aggregate of individuals living in a defined geographic space, suggests important
connections among people and between people and place. They serve important personal
and societal ends so that when destroyed, something valuable is lost. I, and many others,
have argued that even when undertaken with the best of intentions (which is often the
case), destruction of communities in the name of de-concentration of poverty has had this
destructive effect.
There may be situations when community destruction may serve some greater
good, even for the people who are displaced by the destruction. Consider, for example,
the removal of residents from an unsafe building or from a neighborhood in jeopardy due
to life-threatening pollutants. There may even be situations when the dangers, even
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overwhelming dangers, come from other residents, or situations where any semblance of
social order has broken down. In cases like these, most people, even, perhaps, critics of
de-concentration, would say that the displacement, the destruction of what remains of
community, would be appropriate. But these cases are rare. What is more common is the
destruction of viable communities, albeit communities with significant social and
economic problems.
To be clear, I am not arguing blindly for the preservation of high-concentration
communities. I do argue that in a just society such communities would not be forced to
exist. But they do exist, often as a result of governmental policy and therefore, in my
view, society has obligations to them and to their residents. Residents of highconcentration neighborhoods who want to move should be assisted, financially,
emotionally, and practically, to do so. Those who wish to stay should be able to do so in
safety and dignity. For this to happen, however, there needs to be a combined place-based
and people-based strategy. Housing and the physical infrastructure must be improved.
Existing community institutions must be identified and strengthened. New institutions
must be created that address currently unmet needs. Individuals must be given the
opportunity to gain skills that will help them achieve both economic improvement and
life satisfactions.
The first element of this multifaceted program is the production of an adequate
supply of decent affordable housing. This should be accomplished in both low-income
communities and in other communities throughout the economy. As a corollary to the
construction or rehabilitation of affordable units, subsidies of various sorts should be
available to low-income households that would allow them to live, to the greatest extent
possible, where they choose. This might be accomplished through such programs as
Housing Choice vouchers, 128 the District of Columbia’s Local Rent Supplement
program, 129 and Inclusionary Zoning. 130
In order for these programs to work effectively, there must be active enforcement
of federal and local fair housing laws. Too often, the “not in my backyard” syndrome or
outright discrimination has prevented the racial and/or economic integration of
neighborhoods. These obstacles might be overcome with a more rigorous enforcement
policy by governments at all levels.
However, the creation of additional affordable housing and housing support, while
necessary, is not sufficient to improve the quality of neighborhoods, or to reap the
benefits thought to be derived from the economic integration strategy. To obtain these
benefits there must be a comprehensive program of:
• social services, including health, educational, youth development, and other
services;
• economic development, including small business development by local residents,
the attraction of outside employers to the community, and job training and
readiness programs;
• financial services including financial literacy training, the creation and/or
attraction of financial institutions such as commercial banks, credit unions and
Community Development Financial Institutions; and
• political organizing and education.
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Such ideas are not new. As early as the 1960s, during the Great Society and the War
on Poverty, various programs were initiated with the idea of providing more
comprehensive and holistic services to poor neighborhoods and families. Programs such
as the Community Action Program 131 and Model Cities 132 were designed to provide
comprehensive and coordinated community-based physical and human development
activities. In addition, The Office of Economic Opportunity funded many Community
Development Corporations in poor communities throughout the nation. 133 These
programs were place-based efforts to combat poverty and to improve existing
communities. Their lack of success can be attributed to a variety of causes, including
inadequate funding, lack of long-term commitment, and political misjudgments and
missteps, not to mention the intransigency of the structural obstacles to success. 134
Since the demise of the Great Society programs, there have been a series of local,
typically privately initiated, programs that have attempted and, to a great extent, have
succeeded in improving local communities. These programs have been called,
generically, Comprehensive Community Initiatives, or CCIs. 135 Perhaps the most well
known is the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) near the Roxbury-Dorchester
neighborhoods in Boston. In its more than 25 years of operation, DSNI has engaged in
the development of decent affordable housing, the improvement of the local public
schools, youth and parenting programs, and in organizing collaborative efforts with other
neighborhoods. 136
The goal of the CCIs is to involve residents in indentifying and prioritizing local
problems and planning and implementing sustainable solutions to them. While funding
for such initiatives has largely been private with some local government support, the
diversion of some of the federal funds currently used for HOPE VI and similar
dislocating programs could significantly enhance the number and scope of the
community initiatives. While these initiatives are not panaceas for the problems of poor
communities, they have been shown to have potential for more comprehensive placebased improvements and to do so while leaving existing communities intact.
Conclusion
I have attempted in this chapter to provide a counterpoint to the perceived
wisdom of a policy of involuntarily de-concentrating poverty. I have pointed out that the
policy has failed to produce many of the benefits expected of it and has caused a good
deal of harm to those displaced by it. I have also pointed out that even if the goals had
been substantially met and the harms had been averted, the small scale of the policy
leaves it far from being a solution for concentrated poverty. As Edward Goetz has
pointed out:
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Mobility programs face a paradox-they must remain small to remain
politically viable but smallness ensures they will never address
137
concentrated poverty adequately.

Moreover, given the screening process by which residents are selected to move to
less poor communities, commentators have raised considerable doubt as to whether the
benefits that have been shown to occur do so because of the effects of a new
neighborhood and their lower concentrations of poverty or because of the personal and
family characteristics of those who have successfully moved. 138 In fact, Alastair Smith
points out that very little research has been done on the question of whether mixedincome solutions are even necessary. He asks whether other strategies can achieve the
same goals in low-income communities.
What comes with mixed income is a bundle of housing attributes that allow policymakers to say how well it works. If you provide very-low-income people with good
management, good maintenance and housing that blends in, mixed income may not be
necessary. 139
Nevertheless, I do not intend this chapter to be a condemnation of mobility
programs. So long as such programs are truly voluntary and are accompanied with
appropriate support, they should be a part of the policy arsenal arrayed against poverty. In
this chapter, however, I do argue for greater recognition of the importance and, indeed,
the capacities of existing communities. By addressing the structural causes of poverty and
segregation and by preserving and improving existing communities, society can provide
real choices to lower income citizens as to where to live.
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